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We evaluate the claim that the International Monetary Fund precipitated financial crises during the 1990s 
by pressuring countries to liberalize their capital accounts prematurely. Using data from a panel of 
developing economies from 1982-98, we examine whether the changes in the regime governing capital 
flows took place during participation in IMF programs. We find evidence that IMF program participation is 
correlated with capital account liberalization episodes during the 1990s. We verify the robustness of our 
results using alternative indicators of capital account openness. To determine whether decontrol was 
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IMF programs with those of countries who did so independently and find some evidence of IMF-led 
premature liberalizations. 
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The IMF and the Liberalization of Capital Flows  
 
1.  Introduction 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 was followed by a wave of analyses that sought to 
determine its causes. One charge that emerged frequently was that the IMF had indirectly precipitated 
the crisis by pressuring countries to liberalize their capital accounts prematurely. Desai (2003, p. 217), 
for example, wrote: “…the IMF encouraged a disaster-prone policy gamble of capital account 
liberalization in these economies before they had put their “structural house” in order.” Similarly, 
Stiglitz (2002, p. 15) states that “…many of the policies that the IMF pushed, in particular, premature 
capital market liberalization, have contributed to global instability.” 
The IMF did play a role in the movement towards capital account decontrol that took place 
during the 1990s. Fund economists, like others, pointed out the advantages to developing economies of 
access to global capital markets. In September 1997, the IMF’s policy-making Interim Committee 
proposed that the liberalization of capital flows be made a goal for the Fund’s members—a proposal that 
was relegated to the sidelines and then dropped as the IMF sought to stem the massive capital outflows 
from East Asia. 
However, the liberalization of capital flows was part of a global reaction against the Keynesian 
ideology of the post-World War II period. Under the Bretton Woods system, fixed exchange rates and 
capital controls protected countries from destabilizing external shocks. The counter-movement that 
began with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s and accelerated in the 1980s 
sought to remove government controls and allow markets to operate freely. This trend in the developing 
economies was called the “Washington Consensus” by Williamson (1990), who included the decontrol 
of foreign direct investment (but not portfolio flows) in the list of policy measures 
  2Whether or not the IMF was indeed directly associated with the wave of capital account 
liberalization is an empirical issue that can be examined. This paper offers an analysis of the 
determinants of the decontrol of capital accounts in developing economies. We use data from a panel of 
developing economies during the period 1982-98 to determine whether the changes in the regime 
governing capital flows took place during IMF programs. We also investigate the impact of other 
factors, such as currency crises, that may have affected the decision to decontrol. In addition, to assess 
whether liberalization was premature we compare conditions in countries that liberalized while 
participating in IMF programs with those that decontrolled independently.  
While other studies have investigated the conditions that accompany the use (or absence) of 
capital controls, this paper explicitly addresses the issue of the timing of the change from a closed to an 
open capital regime, and is the first to use rigorous testing methods to investigate the linkage between 
that decision and the IMF. Our results are significant for a clearer understanding of the role of the Fund 
in capital account liberalization as well as economic reform in general. 
The next section reviews the IMF’s position on the use of capital controls. Section 3 summarizes 
the literature on the determinants of capital controls. Section 4 outlines the data and methodology used 
in the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents our results, including tests of robustness, and also a 
comparison of economic conditions in countries that liberalized with and without IMF programs. The 
last section offers our conclusions. 
 
2.  IMF and Capital Controls 
The IMF’s Articles of Agreement (Article VI, Section 1a) allowed countries to retain capital 
controls, and stipulated that countries could not draw upon the Fund’s resources to meet a “…large or 
sustained outflow of capital.” Private capital movements, however, began to grow in size and 
  3importance in the late 1950s, and private capital flows were an important component in the adjustment 
process to the oil shock of 1973. The developed countries removed their restrictions on capital flows 
during the 1970s and 1980s. A number of countries in Asia moved in the same direction during this 
period, and were followed in turn by several South American economies at the end of the 1980s. African 
and Middle Eastern countries did not move as far in opening their capital accounts.
1
Using archival sources, Abdelal (2007) has traced the evolution of the IMF’s position on this 
issue, which he shows emanated from the IMF’s management with the support of the U.S. and the 
United Kingdom. Within the IMF, the leading advocates of decontrol were former Managing Director 
Michel Cadmessus and Manuel Guitián, then director of the Monetary and Exchange Affairs 
Department. Guitián (1995, p. 86), for example, wrote that “…a strong case can be made in support of 
rapid and decisive liberalization of capital transactions.”
2
While capital decontrol was never an explicit goal of the IMF and therefore could not be made 
part of the conditions associated with Fund programs, the IMF did at times advocate movement towards 
liberalization. An IMF Occasional Paper (1995, p. 6) by a staff team, for example, observed:  
While generally eschewing an activist policy of urging rapid liberalization, the institution 
has in some cases encouraged developing countries to open their economies to foreign 
capital inflows and to liberalize restrictions on capital account transactions. 
The IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office has examined the Fund’s position on capital account 
liberalization in a sample of developing countries during the 1990s. The IEO (2005, p. 51) found that 
“…a number of IMF-supported programs with some of the sample countries included references to 
aspects of capital account liberalization in the letters of intent (LOIs) or accompanying policy 
memorandums…” But the IEO’s report (2005, p. 92) concluded that “In none of the program cases 
  4examined did the IMF require capital account liberalization as formal conditionality, although aspects of 
it were often included in the authorities’ overall policy package presented to the IMF.” 
Leiteritz (2005) ties the shift in the IMF’s position on capital account decontrol to the U.S. policy 
of promoting access for U.S. financial firms to foreign markets. Similarly, DeLong and Eichengreen 
(2002, p. 237) claim that the Clinton administration’s “…support for capital account liberalization 
flowed naturally from its belief in free and open markets…”, as well as a belief that controls provided 
opportunities for corruption and were difficult to administer. Abdelal (2007), however, points out that 
the private financial sector in the U.S. (Wall Street) and the Institute for International Finance, which 
represents major banks, were much less enthusiastic than the Clinton administration about the transition 
towards capital decontrol.  
This movement culminated in the proposal at the IMF’s 1997 Annual Meeting to make the 
liberalization of capital movements one of the IMF’s goals and to extend the Fund’s jurisdiction to this 
area. The events in Asia, however, overshadowed the discussion, and increased challenges to the 
proposed Amendment. U.S. Congressional opposition and the Russian crisis combined to terminate the 
proposal in 1998. 
 
3.  Determinants of Capital Controls 
There have been a number of studies of the determinants of capital controls since Epstein and 
Schor’s (1992) pathbreaking work.
3 The dependent variable in the majority of these studies was a binary 
indicator of the presence of capital controls available from the IMF, and an appropriate estimation model 
(probit, logit) was utilized to test the significance of proposed determinants of capital controls. The 
results have varied by period and by level of development. 
  5However, a number of empirical relationships seem robust to alternative specifications. Richer 
countries, as measured by per-capita GDP, are less likely to maintain controls, as are countries with 
independent central banks. Countries with larger trade sectors are more likely to have liberalized capital 
flows, as have been countries with larger reserve/import coverage. Some of the earlier studies reported 
that left-wing governments were more inclined to maintain controls, as were governments with large 
consumption/GDP shares. 
A change in regulation may also occur in response to some discrete event, such as a crisis. The 
direction of the change in such an occurrence, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand, a government 
may impose controls in order to stem capital outflows; on the other hand, capital account liberalization 
may serve as a signaling device for government officials to establish their reliability with global capital 
markets.  
Haggard and Maxfield (1993) describe a sequence in which a populist government enacts 
expansionary economic policies, which result in capital flight. The government attempts to assuage the 
situation through the imposition of trade and capital controls, but a crisis ensues. A new team of 
policymakers emerges, and they seek to enhance the credibility of their government, using the 
liberalization of the capital account as a tool for doing so. Convertibility signals the government’s 
intention to undertake reforms, and also constrains its ability to engage in budget deficit financing.
4   
Haggard and Maxfield (1996) point out that there will be domestic coalitions on both sides of the 
issue of capital account liberalization. Crises are likely to increase the power of those in favor of 
liberalization. They find evidence in favor of the proposition that balance of payments crises can prompt 
an increase in the openness of domestic financial markets.  
Rowlands (1999) tested Haggard and Maxfield’s (1993, 1996) hypothesis. He used data for the 
period 1970-1994, which showed that liberalization occurred when the current account balance was 
  6improving, foreign reserves rising and the exchange rate appreciating. He interpreted these results as 
refuting the hypothesis, but also attributed the disparity in results to differences in the definition of 
liberalization and measurement issues.  
Simmons and Elkins (2004), on the other hand, used a definition of currency crises based on 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), and found that such crises were associated with capital account 
liberalization. Abiad and Mody (2005) studied financial reform more broadly using an index of 
measures that included restrictions on international financial transactions. They reported that crises 
result in changes in the status quo, but the nature of the change depended on the type of crisis. Balance 
of payments crises increased the likelihood of reform, but banking crises had the opposite effect. 
There has been relatively little econometric evidence on the impact of the IMF on the process of 
decontrol. Simmons and Elkins (2004) found that the use of IMF credit was associated with capital 
account restrictions, which they attribute to the existence of capital flight at the times of the adoption of 
a Fund program. Abiad and Mody (2005) reported that IMF programs have a strong impact on financial 
reform in countries that are highly repressed, but this effect declines as repression is diminished. 
These two hypotheses—that decontrol takes place during an IMF program or that decontrol is a 
form of signaling during a crisis—are not mutually exclusive. Governments may adopt IMF programs in 
response to crises in the external sector, and the program itself serves as a type of commitment device. 
On the other hand, not all countries facing crises adopt Fund programs, and not all IMF programs are put 
into place in response to currency crises.  
In the analysis below, we differentiate between these two accounts of the process of capital 
decontrol. Our paper distinguishes between the impact on liberalization of IMF programs and the 
consequences resulting from the occurrence of currency crises. We also interact the two variables to 
determine whether the nature of the effects varies in the presence of the other phenomenon. 
  74.  Data and Methodology 
We begin the sample period in 1982 and obtained data for 53 developing and emerging market 
economies.
5 As this paper’s focus is on the linkages between participation in IMF programs and the 
liberalization of the capital account, we first discuss the data on IMF programs and capital account 
controls. We then outline the methodology we use in order to identify the impact of the IMF on the 
decision to liberalize. Details on the sources of the remaining data are listed in Appendix A. 
 
IMF Programs 
  The main IMF facilities designed to meet balance of payments stabilization needs are the Stand-
By Arrangement (SBA) and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), while those designed for longer-term 
development goals have been the concessionary programs, the Structural Adjustment Facility and 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF and ESAF), which have been renamed as the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). In general, Fund members can access credit tranches beyond 
the first 25% of their allowed quota only after a program agreement is signed between the IMF and the 
member’s government. Conditionality ties the disbursement of credit in phases to the fulfillment of 
policies that the government has agreed to implement. We therefore define an IMF program as a signed 
agreement between the IMF and a sovereign government for a future distribution of resources.
6
The distribution of IMF programs by type (nonconcessionary/concessionary), by region, and by 
decade is shown in Table 1. There were 241 nonconcessionary and 74 concessionary programs initiated 
and approved for our sample between 1982 and 1999. The nonconcessionary stabilization programs 
were primarily directed to Latin America (27% of program approvals) and Africa (35%). Predictably, 
given the poverty in the region, African recipients dominate the long-term concessionary structural 
programs with 61% of those programs.  
  8Capital Controls 
We conduct our initial analysis using the binary measure for restrictions on the capital account 
taken from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAR). 
This measure is the only internationally comparable indicator of the legal framework that governs the 
capital account available for a large sample of countries on an annual basis. The IMF changed its 
methodology after 1996 to provide a more detailed measure of the rules and restrictions governing the 
capital account. Glick and Hutchison (2005) extended the original AREAR series through 1998, using the 
descriptions of country practices provided in the IMF’s annual reports, and we incorporate their data into 
ours.
7 As already noted, this is by far the most frequently used measure for capital controls. In Tables 2 
and 3 we use the AREAR data to construct a binary indicator of capital account liberalization that equals 
zero in the preliberalized capital accounts and unity in the year of liberalization and the previous year (t 
and t-1).  
To examine the robustness of our results, we also used two other measures of capital account 
openness. The first was developed by Miniane (2004), who utilized the new criteria developed by the 
IMF, and extended these backwards to 1983 for a set of developing and developed countries. From this 
detailed data, Miniane (2004) constructed an index of openness that ranges from zero to one. We 
transformed this index so that one signifies a completely unrestricted capital account. There are data for 
14 developing countries in this data set. 
The second indicator of capital account openness was developed by Chinn and Ito (2006a, 
2006b). They used the data reported in the AREAR on the existence of multiple exchange rates, 
restrictions on the current and capital accounts (where the latter is measured as the proportion of the last 
five years without controls) and requirements to surrender export proceeds in order to capture the 
intensity of controls on capital account transactions. Their index of openness is the first standardized 
  9principal component of the four variables above, and ranges from -2.5 in the case of full control to 2.5 in 
the case of complete liberalization.  The data is available for 108 developed and developing countries for 
1970-2000. Given our interest, we utilize only data for developing countries for 1982-1998. 
Descriptive statistics for the AREAR, Miniane and Chinn-Ito data are provided in Table 2. We 
note that the Middle East appears to be the most open while Africa has by far the most restrictive capital 
accounts. Appendix B in the working paper version (Joyce and Noy 2005) lists the countries that 
decontrolled capital flows and the dates of liberalization in the three data sets. Alternative measures that 
examine the de facto openness of the capital account are also occasionally used in research on openness 
in international capital markets, but these are not directly relevant to our interest in the impact of the 
IMF on a government’s decision to change its de jure treatment of capital flows. 
  
Estimation Methodology 
The AREAR data on capital account controls and our indicator of capital account liberalization, 
which is the measure we focus on, is binary. Since we are interested in isolating the IMF’s impact on the 
decision to liberalize the capital account, we estimate a multivariate probit specification of the 
determination of the openness of the capital account. We postulate a probit model of this form: 
      [ ] (1 ) (
it i it it it) prob CAPLIB F X P IMF αβ γ δ == + + +                                      (1) 
where CAPLIB is a binary variable denoting the de jure openness of the capital account, 
i α  is the 
country-fixed-effect, X is a vector of macroeconomic and financial variables, P is a vector of political 
and institutional measures and IMF is a measure denoting participation in an IMF program. In order to 
make the signs of the coefficients using the data sets comparable, we transform the IMF’s AREAR data 
so that the dependent variable takes the value of unity when there is an unregulated capital account and 
zero otherwise. 
  10We first specify a series of benchmark regressions with macroeconomic and political control 
variables, based on previous work. We started with a full set of control variables, and incrementally 
delete the least significant variable verifying each step with a reduction in the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC). We then augment these variables with various measures of participation in IMF 
programs. The estimations include country fixed effects (not reported) and a correction for 
heteroscedasticity. The pseudo R
2 is computed using the definition from Zavoina and McElvey (1975). 
The Miniane (2004) and the Chinn and Ito (2006a, 2006b) capital account openness indices, 
which we use to examine the robustness of our results, are continuous. The continuous measures of 
capital account openness (the 0 - 1 Miniane index and the Chinn-Ito –2.5 - +2.5 index) ignore 
differences in the degree of openness or repression that occur for those observations that occupy the 
extreme ends of these measures. For these indices, we use similar specifications to those in the previous 
tables for the AREAR measures but with a Tobit estimation methodology since the data are censored. 
 
5. Results 
Determinants of Liberalization 
Table 3 reports the results for the benchmark regressions, using the indicator of capital control 
liberalization derived from the AREAR data as the dependent variable and incrementally reducing the list 
of control variables as described in the previous section. In the final specification, eq. 2.3, few of the 
variables were significant for the standard 10% threshold. A higher level of government consumption 
was found to be linked to the use of controls, which is most likely due to the government’s need to levy 
taxes. This result was consistent with those reported by Brune et al. (2001), Glick and Hutchison (2005), 
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Milesi-Ferretti (1998). 
  11Coefficients for the other economic variables were not statistically significant in the 
determination of liberalization. However, if the original AREAR data indicating the existence or 
absence of controls are used as the dependent variable (as in table 4), a number of economic variables 
were significant in line with previous research.
8 An increase in the reserve coverage of imports is 
associated with a liberalized capital account; Leblang (1997) and Rowlands (1999) reported similar 
results. Trade openness is associated with unregulated capital flows, as Brune et al. (2001), Grilli and 
Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Milesi-Ferretti (1998), Rowlands (1999) and Simmons and Elkins (2004) also 
found and a rise in short-term debt is associated with an open capital account.  
The binary indicator of a currency crisis is not significant in any of the specifications. Several 
other economic variables that have been mentioned in the literature were also not significant in any of 
our results. These included a foreign interest rate (weighted average of G3 rates), the current account 
scaled by GDP, per-capita GDP, an indicator of banking crises, the government budget surplus, and the 
type of exchange rate regime. 
Several political variables were also initially included in the benchmark regression. An increase 
in government unity, measured by the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the government (a 
Herfindahl index), was associated with lower likelihood of liberalization, and this effect was significant 
at the 1% level. This result suggests that decontrol occurs when the government is divided, and may not 
be able to withstand external pressure. This may also be related to the finding reported by Glick and 
Hutchison (2005), Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Milesi-Ferretti (1998) that an increase in the 
number of government changes was inversely related to the presence of capital controls.  
Corruption was not statistically associated with the act of liberalization, but in results not 
reported (see Joyce and Noy, 2005) was found to be inversely related to the level of openness to capital 
flows and significant at the 5% significance level, indicating that a government can extract rents from 
  12these controls. The remaining political variables, including indicators of left-wing partisanship, 
democracy and the holding of elections, were never significant and were subsequently dropped. A 
dummy variable for the 1990s was positive but insignificant in the initial benchmark regression.  
Table 3 uses the same dependent variable as in Table 2. Observations in which the capital 
account was already open for more than two years were discarded. To the specification reported in eq. 
2.3 we now add our focus variables, the indicator of currency crises and various variables that proxy for 
IMF influence.  
The 1990s variable continues to have a positive but insignificant coefficient, while the currency 
crisis coefficient is negative and insignificant. These results do not change in subsequent specifications. 
In equation 3.1, we add a measure of participation in an IMF program, NEWIMF, which indicates the 
initiation of an IMF program. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level; a country was 
more likely to liberalize its capital account immediately after an agreement was signed with the IMF. 
The sample used for the estimation of equation 3.2 consisted of developing countries with a GDP per 
capita of at least $1,500. The coefficient on the IMF program variable is again positive, only slightly 
bigger and significant at the 5% level. The sample period is restricted to the 1990s for equation 3.3, and 
the IMF program variable is now larger and significant at the 5% level.  
We introduced the size of the IMF program scaled by GDP (IMFSIZE) as an independent 
variable in equation 3.4 to test whether the IMF had more leverage in cases of larger programs or a 
larger stake in pushing for reform. The coefficient has a ‘plausible’ positive sign and is almost 
significant at the conventional 10% level. In equation 3.5, we used two interactive variables, the new 
IMF program and the currency crisis variable, and the IMF program and a no-crisis variable. The 
coefficient on the latter is more than three times as large and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that countries were more likely to liberalize during an IMF program in the absence of a crisis. 
  13In Table 4, we test the robustness of our results using a different dependent variable, the nature 
of the capital account regime in levels using the AREAR data. The pseudo R
2 rises in the levels equations 
from 0.36-0.42 (in Table 3) to 0.63-0.86 in the specifications in Table 4. However, using the AREAR 
data in levels to capture the effect of IMF programs on the actual transition to a liberalized capital 
regime is an imprecise procedure. The existence of IMF programs can be consistent with such a regime, 
but may not have been a direct determinant of the changeover. Therefore, we treat these specifications 
only as an examination of the robustness of our results even though the goodness of fit measure of these 
equations is much higher.  
We again report only the results for the variables of interest. In equation 4.1, a dummy variable 
reflecting the existence of an IMF program is added, and appears with a positive sign: those countries 
that adopted IMF programs were less likely to have controls. The 1990s variable now has a significant 
negative coefficient, which indicates that after controlling for all the other effects we identified, there 
were many countries that maintained controls during the 1990s despite an apparent wave of 
deregulation. The coefficient of the indicator of currency crises is generally insignificant and negative. 
In the following equation we replaced the one IMF variable with two indicators, one for IMF 
programs in the 1980s and one for programs in the 1990s. The coefficient associated with the latter 
variable is significant at the 1% level and is almost 2.5 times bigger than the IMF program coefficient in 
the previous specification, whereas the 1980s program variable is not significant. Countries with IMF 
programs in the 1990s were significantly less  likely to have controls, even though the negative 
coefficient on the 1990s variable shows that controls were more common in other countries during the 
decade. 
In equation 4.3, we limit the observations to the 1990s. The IMF program variable continues to 
be positive and strongly significant, and maintains the same magnitude as that reported in equation 4.2. 
  14Moreover, the currency crisis variable, which was not significant in either of the first two specifications, 
has a negative sign here which is significant. Countries with currency crises during the decade of the 
1990s were more likely to maintain controls. 
We interact the IMF program variable with currency crisis and non-crisis indicators in equation 
4.4. Neither has a significant coefficient, although the IMF-crisis variable has a coefficient that is twice 
as big as the IMF-non-crisis variable.   
In equation 4.5 we differentiate between the non-concessionary IMF programs, such as the 
Stand-by Arrangements, and the long-run facilities, such as the Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility. Both coefficients are positive, but the coefficient of the concessionary programs is significant at 
the 10% level and is three times as big as the coefficient on the non-concessionary program indicator, 
which is not statistically significant. This result is plausible, as capital account liberalization is consistent 
with the structural adjustment policies that are part of the concessionary facilities. 
In equation 4.6 we add the size of the IMF program relative to GDP as a variable. The coefficient 
is not significant for program size but the binary IMF program variable retains its magnitude and 
significance. 
 
Tests of Robustness 
In the remaining tables we use the two other indicators of liberalization, those of Miniane (2004) 
and Chinn-Ito (2006a, 2006b). Table 5 replicates the benchmark specifications of Table 2 using the 
Miniane data in equations 5.1 and 5.2 and the Chinn-Ito data in equations 5.3 and 5.4. A Tobit 
estimation is used to deal with the bias inherent in the least squares estimation procedures with censored 
data.  
  15The specification we arrive at in equation. 5.2 is similar to the one in equation 2.3. However, as 
discussed before, the estimation in levels has higher explanatory power, as is evident in the substantial 
number of statistically significant coefficients. These include reserve coverage and trade openness (- for 
the Miniane data but + for the Chinn-Ito data), government consumption(-), short-term debt (-), the 
fiscal surplus (+), per capital GDP (+), the current account (+), and foreign interest rates (-). 
Government unity is significant here, again with a negative sign. Democratic regimes are now 
found to be less likely to have liberalized international capital account in the Chinn-Ito data set. The 
other controls that were insignificant in Table 2 remain insignificant with both the Miniane and Chinn-
Ito data, and are consequently dropped from the specifications reported in Tables 6 and 7. The results in 
Tables 6 and 7 are remarkably similar, even though the dependent variable is different and therefore the 
sample size is considerably different also. 
In Table 6 we add variables regarding IMF programs to the benchmark specification for the 
Miniane data, equation 5.2 of Table 5. In equation 6.1, the IMF variable appears with an insignificant 
coefficient, while the 1990s variable is positive and significant. In the following equation we distinguish 
between IMF programs of the 1980s and those that occurred in the 1990s. The former has a negative 
coefficient significant at the 10% level, whereas the latter has a positive coefficient, which is significant 
at the 5% level. These results corroborate our conclusion from equation 4.2 that the IMF had a bigger 
impact on eliminating capita controls in the 1990s. 
In equations 6.3 and 6.4, we introduce the interactive IMF and currency crisis variable that we 
had used in Table 3. It appears here with a positive coefficient that is insignificant. We conclude we 
cannot find credible evidence that the IMF’s impact on the existence of capital controls depended on 
whether the country underwent a financial crisis. 
  16Finally, we use the Chinn-Ito index as the dependent variable, and in equations 5.3 and 5.4 we 
report the results of estimations with the control variables. In Table 7 we add the program and other 
variables to the benchmark equation, equation 5.4. The results in the first two equations are identical to 
those reported in Table 6: the 1990s dummy has a positive significant coefficient, while the IMF 
program variable for the 1990s is again positive and significant at the 10% level. In equation 7.3, where 
we again interact the IMF program variable with the crisis and non-crisis variables, the coefficients are 
not significant. 
    
Initial Conditions and Consequences 
Desai (2003) and Stiglitz (2002) and other critics of the IMF have charged that not only did the 
IMF pressure countries to decontrol the capital account, but that this was done before the countries were 
ready for capital flows. Both writers point to this premature liberalization as the main cause of the 
financial crises that hit many emerging economies in the 1990s. As a preliminary step in examining this 
second charge, we determined which liberalization episodes were followed by financial crises in the four 
years following liberalization. We use the occurrence of sudden stops, i.e., reversals in capital flows, 
from Honig (2005) to ascertain the dates of financial crises. The liberalization episodes which were 
followed by crises are marked in Appendix B of the working paper (Joyce and Noy 2005). Crises do not 
seem to be more prevalent among the IMF-led liberalizing countries than in those countries that 
liberalized without IMF intervention.  
To test the ‘premature liberalization’ hypothesis more systematically, we distinguish between the 
ex ante and ex post conditions in the countries that liberalized.
9 We compare the characteristics of 
countries that decontrolled before and during their participation in IMF programs with those that 
liberalized without the IMF. Table 8 reports the mean values of several macroeconomic indicators for 
  17these two groups in the year before liberalization (t-1) as well as the year of liberalization (t). We used 
the Chinn-Ito measurement of capital decontrol to identify the countries that liberalized, as that 
measurement yielded the largest number of episodes of liberalization. 
The countries that decontrolled capital flows during an IMF program had on average larger 
current account deficits, smaller reserve coverage, higher inflation and larger budget deficits in the year 
before liberalization than the countries which removed capital account restrictions independently. The 
average current account deficit in the former group, for example, was 5.5% of GDP versus 2.6% for the 
latter, and this difference is significant at the 10% level. Reserves covered an average 2.5 months of 
imports for the IMF group and 4.2 months for those that liberalized without the IMF, and this difference 
is significant at the 1% level. Inflation for the first group averaged 204% versus 178% for the second, 
while the government budget showed an average deficit of -4.3% of GDP for the IMF group as opposed 
to -2.8% for the independent group. These two pairs of mean values were not significantly different. 
However, the countries that decontrolled during participation in IMF programs showed markedly 
larger improvements in economic conditions in the year when the program began and capital restrictions 
were removed. The current account deficit fell to an average 3.5%, and the two means are no longer 
significantly different. Reserve coverage increased to an average of 3 months in the IMF-affiliated 
group, while reserve coverage for the second group declined somewhat; the difference is only significant 
at the 10% level. The rate of inflation in the group with programs declined to 31.4%, which is 
substantially lower than the rate of 124.8% in the non-program group. Finally, the government budget 
deficit came down to -3.3% in the group with the programs, while declining only very slightly in the 
other group. 
In addition to the macroeconomic environment for liberalizing countries described in Table 8, we 
also report details on the financial systems of those countries in Table 9. Once again, we distinguish 
  18between IMF supported liberalizations and non-IMF ones. There are few noticeable differences between 
the two groups. The non-IMF observations tend to have somewhat deeper financial systems (higher 
ratios of liquid liabilities, deposit bank assets and private credit to GDP) while IMF liberalizing 
countries have a higher ratio of central bank assets (to GDP). Only the differences in the mean values of 
central bank assets and private credit ratios are significant. All of the first four measures increase 
slightly after liberalization in the IMF program countries. We also notice a decrease in a concentration 
index of the financial sector following liberalization, and an increase in stock market capitalization that 
is only apparent for the non-IMF liberalizing countries. 
The countries that liberalized during the IMF programs, therefore, did record adverse 
macroeconomic conditions before they liberalized. However, the domestic authorities adjusted their 
policies, apparently in response to the IMF program, and as a result a stronger macroeconomic 
environment accompanied capital decontrol. There was no immediate adverse impact resulting from the 
liberalization of the capital account on other macroeconomic indicators.
10  
Another interesting hypothesis is that premature liberalization might lead to the re-imposition of 
capital controls.
11 In practice, this appears to be an infrequent occurrence. In Miniane’s data set, only 
one country re-imposed capital controls, Turkey in 1996. This specific case could be associated with the 
global fallout following the Tequila crisis in Mexico, yet this is a unique event. Even among the East 
Asian countries most affected by the crisis of 1997-8, only Malaysia changed its capital account policies 
by imposing some limits on capital outflows; a very public but temporary policy shift.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The empirical evidence reported in this paper is consistent with the hypothesis that capital 
account decontrol in developing countries took place within the context of IMF programs, particularly 
  19during the 1990s. There is some evidence that the change in the capital account regime was more likely 
to occur during the IMF’s concessionary programs. However, Fund programs were also significant 
determinants of capital account decontrol in countries with higher incomes that are generally not the 
typical clients for concessionary loans.  
There is also evidence that liberalization was less likely to occur during a currency crisis. In 
addition, we find little evidence relevant to the accusation that IMF-related liberalization were more 
likely to occur in countries experiencing a financial crisis; when we interact the IMF program variable 
with the crisis variable, the nature of the relationship depends on the choice of indicator of capital 
account openness. 
There is nothing in our findings to suggest that countries liberalized against their will. Since 
capital controls were permissible under the Articles of Agreement, the IMF could not explicitly pressure 
countries to remove them. However, governments could voluntarily include them in their Letters of 
Intent. Cho (2003), Nasution (2003) and Nidhiprabha (2003), in studies of liberalization and reform in 
South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand, found that domestic advocates, including commercial bankers and 
government economists, were influential in the process of deregulation.  
  The IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (2005, p. 94), in its examination of the IMF’s policy 
stance on this issue, concluded:  “In summary, the IMF undoubtedly encouraged countries that wanted 
to move ahead with capital account liberalization, and even acted as a cheerleader when it wished to do 
so, especially before the East Asian crisis, but there is no evidence that it exerted significant leverage to 
push countries to move faster than they were willing to go.” 
The IMF’s decision to advocate decontrol seems to have been taken without placing sufficient 
emphasis on the necessary financial conditions to ensure stability after capital flows were deregulated. 
Advocates of decontrol may have thought that these flows would themselves create these conditions. 
  20Guitián (1995, p. 85), a forceful advocate of liberalization within the IMF, wrote “An open capital 
account will constrain domestic policies to the extent necessary to bring about balance and stability to 
the economy…” DeLong and Eichengreen (2002, p. 251) found that within the U.S. administration, 
“…there was a hope that by forcing the pace of financial liberalization, countries might be compelled to 
more quickly upgrade their domestic regulations and institutions…”  
In retrospect, those hopes were overly optimistic. The events of 1997 and 1998 caused a 
reassessment of the benefits and costs of capital flows, and the IMF now has a much more nuanced 
stance on this issue. Prasad et al. (2003), for example, found little evidence that financial globalization 
was associated with higher output growth, and may have contributed to increased consumption 
volatility. They conclude that financial integration should be done cautiously. Another recent paper by 
the IMF (2002) has presented a sequencing methodology that includes achieving macroeconomic 
stability and promoting financial supervision in the first stage. 
The IMF’s position on capital controls will continue to evolve as circumstances change. As 
reported by the World Bank, Private capital flows to developing economies increased to a record $491 
billion in 2005. Meanwhile, the US has pursued its goal of capital decontrol within bilateral trade 
agreements with Singapore and Chile. The movement towards liberalization may have been halted, but it 
will reemerge in future years, and the IMF will undoubtedly have a key place in the ensuing discussions.  
  21Endnotes:
 
1 See Quinn (2003) for an overview of the record of capital account liberalization. 
2 Guitián presented this paper at a conference in Korea in 1992. Edwards (2003) writes that the paper 
was one of the first to express the change in the IMF’s view on capital account convertibility.   
3 Eichengreen (2001) surveys the literature on capital controls. 
4 Bartolini and Drazen (1997) also treat capital liberalization as a signaling device. 
5 According to the IMF (1995), it began to encourage capital account convertibility in the mid-1980s. 
6 Precautionary programs, which are signed to have an agreement in place should a country require the 
funds, are included in our definition. In addition, in some cases disbursements beyond the first tranche 
are not made because they are no longer necessary or the IMF decides its conditionality has not been 
met. In either case, we include these in our list of programs. 
7 A thorough description of this data and a comprehensive discussion of alternative measures are found 
in Edison et al. (2004), particularly Table 1, p. 224-5.  
8 Results are available from the authors. 
9 For an empirical analysis of the controversy surrounding IMF-led policy choices following financial 
crises, see Hutchison, Noy and Wang (2006). 
10 A comprehensive analysis of economic performance and crisis occurrence ex post capital decontrol, 
including an accounting for differing policies with and without IMF programs, is beyond our scope here. 
11 We thank the anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility. 
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Latin America  65  6  31%  0.16  -0.24 
East Asia  20  4  34%  0.42  0.91 
Middle East  7  1  48%    0.55 
Africa 85  45  1%    -0.67 
Other 64  18  11%    -0.46 
1980s 74  32  16%  0.21  -0.56 
1990s 67  42  19%  0.28  0.08 
 
Note: Nonconcessionary programs include Stand-By Arrangements and Extended Fund Facilities. Concessionary 
programs include the Structural Adjustment Facility and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. The third 
column reports the number of country/year observations with liberalized accounts as a percent of total observations. 
The fourth and fifth columns present averages for the Miniane and Chinn-Ito Indices on the degree of capital account 
liberalization (see text for details). 
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Political and Economic Determinants of Capital Controls 


































































(1.04)   
CURAC 0.00 
(0.16)    
INF 0.00 
(0.56)    
BANCRI 0.25 
(0.88)    
EXREG -0.20 
(0.73)    
LEFT -0.13 
(0.45)    
DEM 0.02 
(0.07)    
ELECT 0.01 
(0.34)    
Observations 503  516 769 
Psuedo R
2 0.54 0.48 0.39 
Akaike  IC  0.33 0.30 0.27 
 
Note: The dependent variable denotes the onset of capital account liberalization: 0 = 
non-liberalized capital account or 1 = liberalization during a two year window. For 
definitions of variables, see Appendix. T-statistics in parentheses; significance levels 
are 10% *, 5% ** and 1%***.  
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The IMF and Capital Controls 































(2.83)   
IMFSIZE       0.01 
(1.54)  
NEWIMF*CURCR         0.30 
(0.70) 
NEWIMF*NOCURCR        1.07*** 
(2.99) 
Observations 623  494  281  623  623 
Psuedo R
2 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.42 0.42 
Akaike  IC  0.30 0.34 0.45 0.30 0.30 
 
Note: The dependent variable denotes the onset of capital account liberalization: 0 = non-liberalized capital account 
or 1 = liberalization during a two year window. Additional control variables are those of Eq. 3.3. The sample in Eq. 
5.2 is restricted to countries with a GDP per capita of $1500 and above (PPP adjusted), while the sample in Eq. 5.3 
is restricted to the 1990s. 
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The IMF and Capital Controls 
































   0.30** 
(2.06) 
IMF80s   -0.18 
(0.89) 
      
IMF90s   0.70*** 
(3.56) 
      
IMF*CURCR       0.50 
(1.45) 
  
IMF*NOCURCR       0.23 
(1.54) 
  
SRIMF         0.12 
(0.88) 
 
LRIMF         0.37* 
(1.81) 
 
IMFSIZE           -1.04 
(0.65) 
Observations  649  649 361 649 649 649 
Pseudo R
2 0.67  0.63 0.86 0.67 0.64 0.65 
Akaike  IC  0.76  0.75 0.80 0.77 0.77 0.77 
 
Dependent variable is either 0 (full controls) or 1 (no controls). T-statistics in parentheses; significance levels 
are 10% *, 5% ** and 1%***. Additional control variables included in all specifications are RES, TRAD, 
GCON, STDBT, CORPT, UNITY, and INFL. For definitions of variables, see Appendix. The sample in Eq. 
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Political and Economic Determinants of Capital Controls 
(Alternative Indices) 
 
Miniane Index  Chinn-Ito Index 














































































(0.81)    -0.07 
(1.08)   
CURAC 0.00 










(0.46)    0.03 
(0.22)   
EXREG -0.02 
(0.52)    0.16 
(1.33)   
LEFT -0.02 
(0.54)    -0.04 
(0.30)   
DEM 0.00 





(0.14)    -0.05 
(0.42)   
Observations  152 152 478 705 








DECOMP fit measure  0.49 0.49 0.39 0.32 
 
Note: Dependent variable for 6.1-6.2 is an ordinal measure of the degree of capital controls ranging from 0 (full 
controls) to 1 (no controls); see Miniane (2004) for details. Dependent variable for 6.3-6.4 is an ordinal measure 
of the degree of capital controls ranging from –2.5 (full controls) to +2.5 (no controls); see Chinn and Ito 
(2006a) for details. All specifications estimated with a Tobit methodology. For definitions of all other variables, 
see Appendix. T-statistics in parentheses; significance levels are 10% *, 5% ** and 1%***. 
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The IMF and Capital Controls (Miniane Index) 
Eq. 7.1 
 


















































DECOMP fit measure  0.52  0.52  0.52  0.52 
Note: Dependent variable for is an ordinal measure of the degree of capital controls ranging 
from 0 (full controls) to 1 (no controls); see Miniane (2004) for details. Model estimated with 
a Tobit methodology. Additional control variables are those of Eq. 6.2. T-statistics in 
parentheses; significance levels are 10% *, 5% ** and 1%***. 
 
Table 7 
The IMF and Capital Controls (Chinn-Ito Index) 
Eq. 8.1 
 


















(1.34)     -0.17* 
(1.75) 
IMF80s    -0.37*** 
(3.23)    
IMF90s    0.22* 
(1.66)    




IMF*CURNOCR     -0.17* 
(1.75)   









DECOMP fit measure  0.32 0.32 0.32  0.31 
Note: Dependent variable is an ordinal measure of the degree of capital controls ranging from 
–2.5 (full controls) to +2.5 (no controls); see Chinn and Ito (2006a) for details. Model 
estimated with a Tobit methodology. Additional control variables are those of Eq. 6.4. T-
statistics in parentheses; significance levels are 10% *, 5% ** and 1%***. 
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Comparison of Macroeconomic Conditions at Time of Liberalization, 




Liberalizations with IMF Programs    Liberalizations without IMF Programs 
  Mean  Std Dev  Number      Mean  Std Dev  Number 
CURAC* -5.51  9.22  64    CURAC* -2.58  7.51  58 
RES*** 2.46  2.07  65    RES*** 4.21  4.39  56 
INF 204.60  1422.63  68    INF 178.26  1023.12  74 




Liberalizations with IMF Programs    Liberalizations without IMF Programs 
 Mean  Std  Dev  Number     Mean  Std  Dev  Number 
CURAC -3.46  8.20  64    CURAC -2.65  8.42  64 
RES* 3.02  2.31  66    RES* 4.07  3.90  62 
INF 31.36  49.39  67    INF  124.82  875.37  73 
GBUD -3.27 4.69  43    GBUD -2.66 5.30  56 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate whether the means of the variables with and without and IMF 
program are significantly different at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Comparison of Financial Conditions at time of Liberalization, 




Liberalizations with IMF Programs    Liberalizations without IMF Programs 
  Mean  Std Dev  Number      Mean  Std Dev  Number 
LIQG 0.29  0.18  65    LIQG  0.33  0.19  70 
CBASG** 0.12  0.09 64    CBASG**  0.08  0.09 62 
DBASG 0.23  0.16  65    DBASG  0.26  0.18  67 
CREDTG** 0.20 0.13  64    CREDTG**  0.26 0.18  66 
CONCNT 0.72  0.21  25    CONCNT  0.76  0.25  13 




Liberalizations with IMF Programs    Liberalizations without IMF Programs 
  Mean  Std Dev  Number      Mean  Std Dev  Number 
LIQG 0.30  0.18  64    LIQG  0.34  0.20  69 
CBASG** 0.14  0.17 64    CBASG**  0.08  0.09 62 
DBASG 0.24  0.16  65    DBASG  0.27  0.19  69 
CREDTG** 0.21 0.14  63    CREDTG**  0.27 0.19  68 
CONCNT 0.69  0.21  28    CONCNT  0.73  0.24  18 
STOCKG 0.20  0.26  26    STOCKG  0.24  0.36  25 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate whether the means of the variables with and without and IMF 
program are significantly different at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Variable Definition  Source 
BANCRI  Banking Crisis  Caprio and Klingebiel (1999)
 a
CBASG  Central bank assets (% of GDP)  Beck et al. (2000)
 a
CHINITO  Capital Account Liberalization Index (-2.5 - +2.5)  Chinn and Ito (2006a) 
CONCNT  Concentration (of financial sector)  Beck et al. (2000)
 a
CORPT Corruption  International Country Risk Guide 
CREDTG  Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
Beck et al. (2000)
 a
CURAC Current  Account (% of GDP)  World Development Indicators 
CURCR Currency  Crisis  Glick and Hutchison (2005) 
DBASG  Deposit money bank assets (% of GDP)  Beck et al. (2000)
 a
DEM Democratic  Regime  Polity IV dataset 
ELECT Elections  (0/1)  Database of Political Institutions
 a
EXREG  Exchange Rate Regime  AREAR dataset 
FINT  Foreign Interest Rate  International Finance Statistics 
GBUD  Government Budget Surplus  World Development Indicators 
GCON  Government Consumption (% of GDP)  World Development Indicators 
GDPCAP  GDP per capita (PPP$)  World Development Indicators 
IMF IMF  Program  IMF Annual Reports 
IMFSIZE  IMF Program Size (% of GDP)  IMF Annual Reports 
INF  Inflation (% Change in CPI)  International Finance Statistics 
KAL  Capital Account Liberalization (0/1)  AREAR dataset 
LEFT Left  Wing  Executive  Database of Political Institutions
 a
LIQG  Liquid liabilities (% of GDP)  Beck et al. (2000)
 a
LRIMF  Long-Run IMF Program (SAF, ESAF)  IMF Annual Reports 
MINIANE  Capital Account Liberalization Index (0 - 1)  Miniane (2004) 
NEWIMF  New IMF Program  IMF Annual Reports 
NOCURCR  No Currency Crisis  Glick and Hutchison (2005) 
RES  Foreign Exchange Reserves (in Months of Imports)  International Finance Statistics 
SRIMF  Short-Run IMF Program (SBA, EFF)  IMF Annual Reports 
STDBT  Short-Term Debt (% of Total Debt)  World Development Indicators 
STOCKG  Stock market capitalization (% of GDP)  Beck et al. (2000)
 a
TRAD  Exports plus Imports (% of GDP)  World Development Indicators 
UNITY  Government Unity (Herfindhal Index)  Database of Political Institutions
 a
a Available at www.worldbank.org
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